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Fenning: Patent Rights for Scientific Discoveries
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
defendant in Case No. 998 received five years for selling thirty
gallons of liquor.
Other notable cases which should be mentioned are those involving the " Minnesota Gag Law"' and the "California Red Flag
Law,"' supported by good, meaty oratory, and commendable in
principle if not in result. Finally, the much-debated naturalizaThe
tion cases of Macintosh and Bland are discussed fully.
familiarity of the reader with these cases makes comment unnecessary.
This is, perhaps, a dangerous book. It is fortunate that it
will not be read except by students of the law, professional or
non-professional. It will be a serious blow to our democratic
dream when the average man comes to observe, as he ultimately
will, the vagaries, the legerdemain, the uncertainty, inherent in
the nature of the judicial method of handling modern social and
economic problems of great magnitude. The Supreme Court is
gradually being divested of its garment of mystery, tradition and
infallibility, as the speed and accuracy of transmitting intelligence
of its decisions increases; and as the public through editorials,
essays and books such as this feels a growing power and right of
criticism. The quality of such criticism is not so important as its
volume and spirit of freedom.
And this fact is not derogatory to the Supreme Court. Competent as it is, it is powerless to advance beyond the medium
through which, perforce, it must do its work. The ultimate difficulty we shall have to face is the invention of some modern machinery to meet the economic and social problems which modern
civilization, willy-nilly, has evoked. Until then, it is the business of lawyers solemnly, and with inscrutable countenances, to
reassure themselves and their clients that Reason Is The Life of
The Law.
-ROBmT

T. DoNEY.

Morgantown, W. Va.

PATENT RIGETS Fop ScIENrmc DiscovEmUs. By C. J. Hamson. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1930. Pp. 286.
The Constitution provides that Congress shall have power "to
promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
0 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931).
7Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 51 S. COt.532 (1931).
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respective writings and discoveries."' President Washington, in
his first message to Congress, suggested "the expediency of giving
effectual encouragement as well to the introduction of new and
useful inventions from abroad as to the skill and genius at home."
In response thereto Congress enacted the first patent act in 1790.
As far as the patent statutes are concerned substantially no attention has ever been given to science or discoveries as such although both terms are used in the Constitution. The present
statute provides for a patent for a new and useful art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter or plant, with certain
limitations. From the beginning the courts have interpreted these
terms as relating to practical embodiments and not to merely
The person working in pure science may
scientific discoveries
discover a new fundamental fact, material or law, which will enable subsequent developers to reap great rewards, but the patent
system makes no effort to compensate the original scientist. Indeed, most scientists do not care for monopolistic compensation
and in general the scientific societies throughout the world frown
dawn on the proposal; this is particularly true in the United
States where the movement is not advocated by any organization.
There are some instances in recent times in which physicians have
obtained patent protection for new medicinal compositions but
chiefly to insure proper manufacture and use rather than for
personal gain.
The matter has been broached from time to time for a good
many years. Since the World War there has been some acutely
renewed agitation, mainly in Europe, toward a scheme which
might in some way require the public or the individual who benefits by a scientific discovery to compensate the discoverer for the
use of the discovery in a practical or commercial embodiment.
No nation has done this although the League of Nations has given
the matter consideration and there has been a considerable literature built up about the idea. Little has been written in English
on the subject and for that reason the present book is especially
welcome. English-speaking nations as a rule have met the matter without enthusiasm. In order to stimulate interest in the
subject the Linthicum Foundation at Northwestern University
Law School offered a prize for the best essay relating to the protection of scientific discoveries and the author of the present volume won the first prize. He is an Englishman so that much of
'U. S. Const., art. 1, § 8, par. 8.
235 U. S. C. A. § 31 (1926).

See O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 14 L. ed. 601 (1853).
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his text bears an English rather than an American slant. He
presents, however, a fair review of what has been written on the
subject and follows it with his own proposal of a comprehensive
scheme for compensating those who make scientific discoveries.
Appendices contain essays by American lawyers so as to more
clearly tie the matter into attitudes on this side of the Atlantic.
Anyone interested in the subject will find here collected in a
single volume sufficient information to let him make up his mind
upon the desirability and possibility as a practical matter of compensating those working in pure science.
In general those having to do with patents and inventions are
less than lukewarm on the subject, not as a matter of sentiment
but because the difficulties of working out a satisfactory scheme
seem insurmountable. Possibly a Constitutional amendment would
be necessary since the courts in the United States seem to have
defined the term inventor used in the Constitution in such a
limited way as to exclude those working in pure science whose discoveries as such are not immediately practically useful.
-KARL

FENNING.

Washington, D. C.

TORT. By Percy H. Winfield.
Cambridge: At the University Press; New York: The Macmillan
Company. 1931. Pp. xii, 254.
In this small volume, which embodies the Tagore lectures for
1930 delivered by Professor Winfield at the University of Calcutta, an eminent legal historian undertakes "to trace the liaison
between tortious obligation and other regions of the law".' It is
not a treatise on the law of tort. It is merely an attempt "to
separate liability in tort as sharply as possible from liability
arising from crime, from contract, from trust, from bailment,
from the law of property, from quasi-contract and from quasitort"
The author is not the first to attempt this task, but certainly no one has performed it with more care and thoroughness.
With some of Professor Winfield's views the reader may not
agree. If he belongs to the "pessimistic school" which denies the
existence of any general principle of liability in the law of torts
and consequently has abandoned hope of defining it, he will disP. V.
'Pp. 2, 3.
THE

PROVINCE OF THE LAW OF

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1932

3

